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Abstract—As interest in using Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs)
for deployments in scenarios such as asset monitoring increases,
the need to consider security and privacy issues also becomes
greater. One such issue is that of Source Location Privacy (SLP)
where the location of a source in the network needs to be kept
secret from a malicious attacker. Many techniques have been
proposed to provide SLP against an eavesdropping attacker. Most
techniques work by first developing an algorithm followed by
extensive performance validation. Differently, in this paper, we
model the SLP problem as an Integer Linear Programming
optimization problem. Using the IBM ILOG CPLEX optimiser,
we obtain an optimal solution to provide SLP. However, that
solution is centralised (i.e., requires network-wide knowledge)
making the solution unsuitable for WSNs. Therefore, we develop
a distributed version of the solution and evaluate the level of
privacy provided by it. The solution is hybrid in nature, in
that it uses both spatial and temporal redundancy to provide
SLP. Results from extensive simulations using the TOSSIM WSN
simulator indicate a 1% capture ratio is achievable as a trade-off
for an increase in the delivery latency.
Index Terms—Source Location Privacy, Wireless Sensor Net-
works, Optimal Routing, Integer Linear Programming.
I. INTRODUCTION
As wireless sensor networks (WSNs) are becoming increasingly
viable for large scale deployments, applications such as
asset monitoring and tracking can be implemented using this
technology [1, 2]. In an asset monitoring application, the nodes
in the network monitor their surrounding area to detect the
presence of a valuable asset. When such an asset is detected a
message is transmitted from that source node back to a base
station called the sink. As the range of the sensor nodes is
typically less than that between the source and sink, multiple
hops need to be used for the message to reach the sink.
To protect the content of this data, messages can be
encrypted, however, the act of routing the message to the sink
reveals context information about the event that encryption does
not and can not protect. One example of context information
that needs to be protected is the location of the source, as
revealing this information would allow an attacker to follow
messages through the network to the source and capture it.
The SLP problem was originally presented as the panda hunter
game [3, 4]. In this situation pandas are being monitored by a
WSN and information is being reported to conservationists
working at a base station. Other situations such routing
messages between soldiers on a battlefield would benefit from
applying SLP techniques.
Much work has been done on developing new routing
strategies that provide SLP [5] since the seminal work. Most
works first develop a technique before using simulations to
demonstrate the performance of the technique and some works
use techniques such as information theoretic analysis to quantify
the privacy loss of a routing strategy. Often, the solution space
will capture the trade-offs inherent in the problem such as
privacy level, energy usage, message delivery ratio and message
latency. However, it is often challenging to appropriately
parametrise the algorithms to achieve the right trade-offs.
Constraint programming (CP) is a technique which applies a
set of constraints to decision variables with the aim to maximise
or minimise an objective function. Generic solvers then process
all three parts and output an optimal solution (if one is possible).
Many problems have been expressed as constraint satisfaction
problems (CSPs) such as scheduling, planning and networking.
Integer linear programming (ILP) is a subset of CP where
the relations in the constraints must be linear. Different to all
current approaches, in this paper we model the scheduling of
messages being routed from the source to the sink as an ILP
problem and then use a solver to obtain an optimal solution,
if it exists. However, the model solution assumes network-
wide knowledge, making it unsuitable for WSN deployment.
Using the structure of the optimal solution, we propose a novel
distributed hybrid algorithm to provide SLP. Our results show
that the protocol is near-optimal under certain parametrisations,
independent of network size and application parameters such
as the period between the source sending messages.
The following three contributions are made in this paper:
1) We model SLP-aware routing protocol from a source to
a sink as an ILP optimisation problem.
2) We develop a novel distributed routing protocol inspired
from the output of the ILP model.
3) We perform simulations of the routing protocol using
TOSSIM and results show that the protocol is near optimal
in terms of privacy level, i.e., a low 1% capture ratio for
certain parametrisations.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section II
we discuss the related work. We then describe the ILP model in
Section III, the results of the model and how it influenced our
algorithm’s design in Section IV, and the routing protocol in
Section V. Section VI contains the experimental setup for the
results in Section VII. We discuss implications in Section VIII
and finally conclude with a summary in Section IX.
II. RELATED WORK
Source location privacy was originally introduced in [3, 4]
where the authors introduced Phantom Routing a two-stage
routing protocol to provide SLP. The first stage involves a
message taking a directed random walk either towards or away
from some landmark node. Once the message reaches the
landmark node it is forwarded to the sink in the second stage.
Two variants were presented, PRS [4] which uses flooding in
the second stage and PSRS [3] which uses single path routing.
Many routing-based SLP schemes have since been pro-
posed [5]. Several solutions aimed to improve the directed
random walk phase of phantom routing, such as angle-based
routing [6] which chooses the next node based on angles
between key nodes. Other routing-based techniques involve
routing in a ring around the sink before finally reaching it [7].
An alternative technique initially proposed in the seminal
work, was to use fake sources that broadcast identical messages
to the real sources. The seminal work concluded that on their
own they do not assist in providing SLP, but this was rebutted
in [8] and many other techniques have since made use of
fake messages. Fake sources provide SLP by generating fake
messages that lead the attacker away from the real sources [9].
Recent work has focused on dynamically determine good
parameters to use online [10]. However, fake source techniques
are often criticised for their high energy usage.
Many techniques have since combined routing and fake
sources to improve the levels of SLP provided. One example
is tree-based diversionary routing [11] which imposes a tree
structure on the network and then routes fake messages through
the tree. PEM in [12] extends the routing path from source
to sink with branches of fake sources. The idea of fogs or
clouds [13, 14] is also similar where a message is routed round
a group of nodes called a fog and then onwards to other fogs.
Fake messages are also used to provide additional privacy.
Other techniques to provide SLP against local attackers
include using space in MAC beacon frames to disseminate
messages from the source to other areas in the network before
being routed to the sink [15]. Coordinated jamming [16] which
uses jamming to defeat localisation techniques. And, data
mules [17, 18] where a mobile agent gathering messages near
the source and moves near the sink before broadcasting them.
The solutions discussed so far have focused on a local dis-
tributed eavesdropping attacker and there are other capabilities
which can be considered [19]. Attackers with a global view
of the network are one such example. Techniques that provide
privacy against them tend to take different approaches to local
attackers. For example some techniques require that all nodes
broadcast periodically according to some ruleset even if there
is no message to send [20, 21]. Other traffic decorrelation
techniques [22] have also been used.
A popular technique for generating an optimal solution
to problems such as (i) optimising sensor node deployment
TABLE I: Model parameters
Symbol Description
|V | The number of nodes
R The communication range of the nodes
S A set of node ids that send messages
sink The sink id
C A mapping between node ids and their 2D coordinates
Astart The id of the node the attacker starts at
RA The eavesdropping range of the attacker
Psrc The time between the source sending messages
Psafety The maximum simulation time
Ω How many slots a second is divided into
locations [23], (ii) energy efficient routing [24], and (iii)
others [25], is constraint programming (CP). CP is a type
of programming described using a set of decision variables
that store the output of the model, an objective function that
ranks the goodness of variables and a set of constraints that
define what values for a solution are valid. Using a solver, an
optimal solution for the problem can be obtained.
Similar to CP, is integer linear programming (ILP) where the
relations specified in the constraints between the variables must
be linear. ILP has been used to find solutions that optimise for
energy usage or delivery latency in a WSN. Our approach will
instead optimise the routing of messages to provide SLP.
III. CONSTRAINT PROGRAMMING MODEL
In this section we describe the ILP model1, including the
rationale for certain constraints. Our ILP model is written in
IBM’s Optimisation Programming Language (OPL). There are
multiple ILP solvers present with IBM ILOG CPLEX version
12.6.3. We used the CP solver as it was able to produce optimal
results faster and also scale to larger network sizes than the
CPLEX solver. The CP solver proves optimality by showing
that no better solution can be found, while the CPLEX solver
obtains a lower bound proof using cuts and linear relaxation.2
The network was modelled as a directed graph G = (V,A)
where V is the set of nodes and A is the set of arcs. An arc is
a 2-tuple (u, v) where u is the origin and v is the target. Each
node in V was assigned a 2D coordinate C and the euclidean
distance was calculated between each node. If the distance
between two different nodes was less than or equal to the
communication range R of the sensor nodes, then that arc is
present in A. By using a directional graph we can model more
networks, in this work if (u, v) ∈ A =⇒ (v, u) ∈ A. The
paths that messages can travel along is defined by the arcs in
A then and the paths the attacker can move along is modelled
as a directed graph GA = (V,AA) routed at the node with id
Astart where the attacker starts. If the distance between two
nodes is less than the attacker’s eavesdropping range RA then
AA contains that arc, this also means the attacker can move
along that arc. Once the attacker finds the source it will remain
1The source code for this model can be found at bitbucket.org/MBradbury/
slp-attacker-ilp/raw/a4e326e/SLP/SLP.mod
2ibm.com/software/integration/optimization/cplex-cp-optimizer/mp-cp
at that location, so the attacker cannot move along arcs which
start at the source. As the attacker moves through the network,
it can only move to be co-located with another node. In this
paper, we assume the attacker’s eavesdropping range is equal
to the sensor node’s transmission range (R = RA).
The sink is a special node to which messages are routed
and the sources (S) are nodes that generate one message every
Psrc. We assume there is a single sink and source.
There is an upper bound on the duration of the model
(Psafety), within which routing and attacker movement is
considered. Time (T ) is discretised by dividing it into slots,
there are Ω slots per second. Each node can send a single
message in each slot. A node may choose to send no messages
in a given slot. The attacker can therefore either move in
response to a single message or not move at all in a given slot.
To ensure the attacker could reach the source, the attacker’s
starting position was never set so its distance in hops from
the source was greater than Psrc · Ω. As otherwise the safety
period may be reached before the attacker has a chance to
capture the source. The attacker can respond to a message a
neighbour sends in a time slot if that message had not been
previously responded to. If no messages are sent by a neighbour
the attacker must remain where it is.
Time 0 is special as it is used to set the attacker’s position,
no messages are sent at this time. After time 0 when a node
broadcasts a message we assume network links are perfect
and all neighbours receive the message, even if multiple nodes
broadcast in that time slot. In this case we assume a collision
detection and retransmission is used to ensure message delivery.
Messages generated by a source (M) are represented by a
2-tuple where the first element (src) is the id of the source
that generated the message and the second element (seq) is
the message number. This ensures each message is unique.
P̂safety = dΩ · Psafetye (1)
P̂src = dΩ · Psrce (2)
T = 0..P̂safety (3)
T1 = 1..P̂safety (4)
M = { (src, seq) | src ∈ S,
seq ∈ 1..dPsafety · Psrce }
(5)
D(i, j) =
√
(i.x− j.x)2 + (i.y − j.y)2 (6)
A = { (u, v) | u, v ∈ V, D(u, v) ≤ R ∧ u 6= v } (7)
N(i) = { j | (i, j) ∈ A, i 6= j } (8)
AA = { (u, v) | u, v ∈ V, D(u, v) ≤ RA } \
{ (s, v) | s ∈ S, v ∈ V, s 6= v } (9)
NA(i) = { j | (i, j) ∈ AA, i 6= j } (10)
A. Objective Function
Two decision variables are used to capture the output of the
model. The broadcasts performed is a three dimensional array of
booleans with the node ids, message and time as the dimensions
(B : V ×M× T → B). This variable is intended to capture
whether a node sends a message at a given time. The other
decision variable is the attacker path which is a two dimensional
array of booleans with time and the arcs an attacker can take
as the dimensions (PA : T ×AA → B). This variable captures
whether at a given time an attacker moves along an arc.
The objective function for this model is to maximise the
distance between the attacker’s final position and the source(s)
in the network. As the aim in providing SLP is to prevent the
attacker from reaching the source, we can say the further the
attacker is from the source the better SLP has been provided
within a safety period.
maximise
∑
s∈S
e∈AA
PA(P̂safety, e) ·D(s, e.v)
subject to Routing Constraints ctR1 to ctR6,
Attacker Constraints ctA1 to ctA7.
(11)
B. Routing Constraints
Here, the constraints on how messages are generated by the
source and how they are routed in the network are described.
ctR1 At t = 0, no messages are broadcasted.
ctR2 From t > 0, each source node generates a message every
Psrc until the safety period is reached.
ctR3 No node can broadcast more that a single message
concurrently. This means that in a given time slot a node
must send one message or no messages.
ctR4 Once a message is broadcasted by a node it is not
broadcasted by that node again.
ctR5 A node can only forward a message after a neighbour
broadcasted that message in a previous time slot.
ctR6 All messages sent by the sources must reach the sink.
∀n ∈ V • ∀m ∈M •B(n,m, 0) = 0 (ctR1)
∀n ∈ S • ∀m ∈M : m.src = n •
B(n,m, (m.seq − 1) · P̂src + 1)
(ctR2)
∀τ ∈ T1 • ∀n ∈ V • 1 ≥
∑
m∈M
B(n,m, τ) (ctR3)
∀m ∈M • ∀n ∈ V • ∀τ1 ∈ T1 •
B(n,m, τ1) =⇒ 0 =
∑
τ2∈T , τ2>τ1
B(n,m, τ2) (ctR4)
∀n ∈ (V \ S) • ∀m ∈M • ∀τ1 ∈ T1 •
B(n,m, τ1) =⇒ 1 ≤
∑
neigh∈N(n)
τ2∈T , 0<τ2<τ1
B(neigh,m, τ2) (ctR5)
∀m ∈M • 1 ≤
∑
n∈N(sink)
τ∈T1
B(n,m, τ) (ctR6)
C. Attacker Constraints
This section details the constraints on how the attacker moves
through the network. These constraints have been constructed
so the attacker will follow the messages it receives. If the
attacker was allowed to move independently of messages then
it would move away from the source due to the objective
function. Therefore, we require that (i) the attacker only moves
in response to messages (ctA4, ctA7) and (ii) the attacker will
only consider a message once as otherwise it might follow that
message as it moves away from the source (ctA5, ctA6).
To simplify attacker constraints four predicates about the
attacker’s movement are defined. AM2A checks if the attacker
moved to n at time τ . AM2NA checks if the attacker moved
to a neighbour of n at τ . ASM checks if the attacker remained
where it was at τ . AMBA checks if an attacker moved because
of a message m at τ .
AM2A(n, τ) = 1 =
∑
e∈AA, e.v=n
PA(τ, e) (12)
AM2NA(n, τ) = 1 =
∑
neigh∈NA(n)
AM2A(neigh, τ) (13)
ASM(τ) = 1 =
∑
e∈AA, e.u=e.v
PA(τ, e) (14)
AMBA(m, τ) = 1 =
∑
e∈AA, e.u 6=e.v
PA(τ, e) ∧B(e.v,m, τ) (15)
ctA1 At t = 0 the attacker moves from the attacker’s starting
position to that same position.
ctA2 The attacker makes exactly one move each time slot.
ctA3 A move must be from the attacker’s current location.
ctA4 If the attacker moves to n from m at time τ , then it must
be because at time τ the node n broadcasted a message.
ctA5 If the attacker receives a message that it has not
previously moved in response to, then the attacker moves
in response to that message.
ctA6 If the attacker moved in response to a message at time τ ,
then at no time τ ′ > τ will the attacker move in response
to that message again.
ctA7 If the attacker is at node n and no neighbours send a
message, then the attacker moves along the (n, n) edge.
PA(0, (Astart,Astart)) = 1 (ctA1)
∀τ ∈ T • 1 =
∑
e∈AA
PA(τ, e) (ctA2)
∀τ ∈ T1 • 1 =
∑
e1,e2∈AA, e1.v=e2.u
PA(τ − 1, e1) ∧PA(τ, e2) (ctA3)
∀n ∈ V • ∀τ ∈ T1 •
1 =
∑
e∈AA, e.v=n∧e.u6=e.v
PA(τ, e) =⇒ 1 =
∑
m∈M
B(n,m, τ) (ctA4)
∀n ∈ V • ∀m ∈M • ∀τ ∈ T1 •
B(n,m, τ) ∧ AM2NA(n, τ − 1) ∧ 0 =
∑
t2∈T , 0<τ2<τ
AMBA(m, τ2)
=⇒ AM2A(n, τ) (ctA5)
∀τ1 ∈ T1 • ∀m ∈M •
AMBA(m, τ1) =⇒ 0 =
∑
τ2∈T , τ2>τ1
AMBA(m, τ2) (ctA6)
∀τ ∈ T1 • ∀e ∈ AA •
PA(τ − 1, e) ∧ 0 =
∑
n∈NA(e.v)
m∈M
B(n,m, τ) =⇒ ASM(τ)
(ctA7)
IV. MODEL RESULTS
In this section we describe the output from the ILP model
for one combination of parameters3. We ran the model for
a variety of different parameters including 3x3, 4x4 and 5x5
grids with the sink and source at different locations. Larger
networks became infeasible to run due to the large amount of
memory required. The results in Figure 1 show a 5x5 network
with the source in the top left corner and the attacker starting at
the sink which was positioned in the centre. This configuration
was chosen as it has been previously investigated [9, 10] and
allowed the state space of the model to be small enough for a
solution to be found within a reasonable time.
Figures 1a to 1g show the pattern of broadcasts and Figure 1h
shows how the distance of the attacker from the source changes
over time. From the results we observed four major trends:
1) The routing path should go around the sink and approach
from the opposite direction to the source.
2) Some routes should take the shortest path from the source
to the sink.
3) Messages should be delayed so multiple messages are
grouped together.
4) Messages should be delayed as late as possible with
respect to the safety period.
Some of these observations have been used in previous work,
while others have not. For example, having the route approach
the sink from a direction other than the one the source is in has
been used in Phantom Routing [3] and Ring-based Routing [7].
We have also seen algorithms whose routes occasionally take
the shortest path [26]. However, we have not seen delaying and
grouping messages previously in providing SLP. By delaying
and grouping messages the attacker should end up with less
time to make moves towards the sink within the safety period
as shown by Figure 1h, where the attacker moves mainly near
the end of the simulation (towards the top of the graph). By
grouping and allowing messages to be delivered out-of-order
we also force the attacker to require a larger memory to ensure
previously received messages are ignored in the future.
V. ROUTING ALGORITHM
In this section we describe the implementation of the routing
algorithm inspired by the model’s output. There are four stages:
1) AvoidSink: In this first stage messages are routed around
the sink.
2) Backtrack: Messages may end up attempting to go
towards the sink and not having any valid routes, so
they need to backtrack.
3) ToSink: Once a message has finished routing to avoid the
sink it needs to be delivered to the sink.
4) FromSink: Finally, the message is sent in a starburst from
the sink.
A. Stage 1: Avoid Sink
In order to provide SLP the most important thing we need to do
is be able to route messages reliably around the sink and have
3Other results are available at warwick.ac.uk/matthewbradbury/slp/ilp
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(h) Attacker Distance from Source
Fig. 1: An output of the ILP model for a 5x5 network with node 1 sending 7 messages to the sink at node 13 with a period of
1 second and 1 second is broken up into 9 slots. The attacker starts at node 13. Message broadcasts are represented by arrows
from the sending node to the receiving nodes, the arrows are labelled with the time slot of the broadcast. Lines in (h) are
labelled with the message number the attacker responded to and the location of the attacker is shown above the point.
them approach it from the opposite direction that the source is
in. This requires every node to be aware of its neighbours, as
one will be chosen to be the next in the path. We also require
that every node n knows its distance to the sink ∆sink(n), its
distance from the source ∆src(n) and the distance between the
sink and source ∆ss. These values are found by the landmark
nodes (sink/source) flooding the network. Every node should
know these values for each node in its 1-hop neighbourhood.
There is a parameter called message group size which
specifies how many messages to group together. By grouping
together the algorithm will delay the messages each hop so
that the messages reach ∆ss hops travelled at the same time.
Messages sent earlier in the group will be delayed longer. The
delay is specified in Equation 16, where i is the position in
the message group, Psrc is the source period and α is the time
it takes a message to send from one node to another. This is
calculated at the source when the message is sent.
delay(i) =
i · Psrc + α ·∆ss
∆ss
(16)
Retransmissions are used to ensure reliability along the route.
If retransmissions to a target fail a fixed number of times, then
that target is blacklisted and another node will attempt to be
used. If further retransmissions fail, then a poll message is sent
which asks neighbours to broadcast their information. This is
performed to ensure that the most up-to-date information is
being used to make the routing decisions. Retransmissions are
stopped when an acknowledgement packet is received or the
maximum number of retransmissions have been sent.
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Fig. 2: Showing the links a node n has between each m neigh-
bour in its one hop neighbourhood that satisfies: ∆src(m) >
∆src(n)∧
(
∆sink(n) >
∆ss
2 ∨∆sink(m) ≥ ∆sink(n)
)
. Nodes
that have no neighbours that satisfy this are marked in gray.
The source is a pentagon and the sink is a hexagon.
B. Stage 2: Backtrack
There is the possibility that a message may reach a node which
has no further neighbours to choose from, for example node
20 in Figure 2. In this case the message backtracks to a node
that is further from the sink that was not the previous hop in
the route. The next hop is then chosen using the avoid sink
logic. This should allow a message to avoid the area of nodes
that should not be used in the routing path (highlighted in
grey in Figure 2). Backtracking is only done on node n when
∆src(n) < ∆ss as this is a node that would otherwise lead the
message closer to the sink.
C. Stage 3: To Sink
When a node’s ∆src(n) ≥ ∆ss then the message has passed the
area that would lead it towards the source. When this message
has reached a node with no neighbours that are further from the
sink, the message is at a local maxima for the sink distance, so
the message is routed back towards the sink. When a message
reaches a certain number of hops travelled it is routed back
to the sink. This is to ensure bounded message latency and to
prevent the message going too far on very large networks. As
with routing to avoid the sink, retransmissions and blacklisting
are used to provide a reliable message transmission to the sink.
D. Stage 4: From Sink
Finally, once the message reaches the sink, it is broadcasted
in a starburst pattern away from the sink in all directions for
a limited number of hops. Model results where the sink was
the furthest point required this behaviour to ensure that the
attacker is lured to the furthest location from the source. This
behaviour was also observed in Figure 1g.
VI. EXPERIMENTAL SETUP
A. Simulation Environment and Network Configuration
The TOSSIM (V2.1.2) simulation environment was used in
all experiments [27]. TOSSIM is a discrete event simulator
capable of accurately modelling sensor nodes and the modes
of communications between them.
A square grid network layout of size n × n was used in
all experiments, where n ∈ {11, 15, 21, 25}, i.e., networks
with 121, 225, 441 and 625 nodes respectively. The node
neighbourhoods were generating using LinkLayerModel4 with
the parameters in [10, Table I]. Noise models were created
using the first 2500 lines of casino-lab.txt5. A single
source node generated messages and a single sink node
collected messages. These nodes were assigned positions in the
SourceCorner configuration from [9], where the source is in the
top left corner and the sink at the centre of the grid. The rate
at which messages from the real source were generated was
varied, as shown in Section VII. At least 10,000 repeats were
performed for each combination of parameters. Nodes were
located 4.5 meters apart. The node separation distance was
determined experimentally, based on observing the pattern of
transmissions in the simulator. This separation distance ensured
that messages (i) pass through multiple nodes from source to
sink, (ii) can move only one hop at a time, and (iii) will usually
only be passed to horizontally or vertically adjacent nodes.
B. Attacker Model
A reactive attacker model based on the patient adversary
introduced in [3] is used. The attacker initially starts at the
sink. When a message is received the attacker will move to the
1-hop source’s location if that message has not been received
before. To detect if a message has been received before, we
4LinkLayerModel is a tool provided with TOSSIM that extrapolates link
strengths from node coordinates based on experimental data.
5casino-lab.txt is a noise sample file provided with TOSSIM.
TABLE II: Safety Period (seconds).
Network Size Source Period (seconds/message)
2.0 1.0 0.5 0.25
11× 11 33.24 16.65 8.56 4.51
15× 15 49.59 24.82 12.59 6.54
21× 21 74.52 37.40 18.84 9.66
25× 25 91.17 45.73 23.03 11.76
assume that an attacker has access to the message type and
sequence number. Once the source has been found the attacker
will no longer move. This is commensurate with the attacker
models used in [8, 9, 10].
C. Safety Period
A metric called safety period was introduced in [3] which
captured the number of messages needed to capture the source.
The higher the safety period is, the higher is the privacy level.
This issue with this definition of safety period is that it is
unbounded and in problem of asset monitoring it does not
make sense to consider an unbounded safety period.
If the asset is immobile, then the attacker can simply perform
an exhaustive search of the network and providing SLP is
irrelevant. If the asset is mobile, then performing an exhaustive
search is less desirable as an asset may move into a previously
searched area of the network. So using the context provided
by message broadcasts is preferred. This means that the SLP
problem can only be considered when it is time-bounded, i.e.,
when the asset has to be captured within a certain time window.
Therefore, we use an alternate by analogous definition of safety
period, where if the attacker fails to capture the source within
this period it is considered to have failed to capture the source.
As flooding has been shown to provide no SLP [3] we use
the average time it takes the attacker to capture the source as
a baseline and double it to calculate the safety period (shown
in table II) for the protocol in this paper.
D. Simulation Experiments
An experiment constituted a single execution of the simulation
environment using a specified protocol configuration, network
size and safety period. An experiment terminated when the
source node had been captured or the safety period had expired.
An attacker was implemented based on the log output from
TOSSIM. It maintains internal state about its location using
node identifiers. When a node receives a message, if the attacker
is at that location it will move based on the attacker model.
The algorithm being tested has four parameters: the max-
imum walk length, the buffer size, the number of messages
to group and the probability the message is sent directly to
the sink. As the maximum walk length is simply to provide
a finite bound in large networks, it was set to 100 hops. The
number of messages to group was varied between {1, 2, 3, 4}.
The buffer size was set to 10 messages as we do not expect
more than 10 concurrent messages being sent in the network at
one time. Finally, the probability of sending a message directly
to the sink was varied between {0, 0.2, 0.4, 0.6}.
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Fig. 3: Results showing the receive ratio.
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Fig. 4: Results showing the capture ratio.
VII. RESULTS
As part of these results we will analyse four key metrics: (i)
receive ratio: the percentage of messages sent by the source
and received at the sink, (ii) capture ratio: the percentage of
runs in which the source was captured, (iii) messages sent
per second: the number of messages sent by all nodes in
the network per second, and (iv) latency: the time it takes a
message sent by the source to be received at the sink.
All results shown are for when the probability that a message
is sent directly to the sink is 20%. Lower probabilities gave
similar, but slightly worse results and higher probabilities
produced much worse results. Therefore, for reasons of space,
we have omitted results for the probabilities of 0%, 40% and
60% as 20% performed better. Also, only the results for the two
source periods 2 and 0.25 seconds per message are included
as the patterns between these are similar to the results for 1
and 0.5 seconds per message.
A. Receive Ratio
A high receive ratio between 75% and 95% is observed.
Fewer messages were delivered with larger networks and larger
messages group sizes. This suggests that the attacker was
hearing most of the source messages, meaning that the privacy
level imparted by the algorithm is due to the efficiency of the
protocol and not due to the unreliability of the network.
B. Capture Ratio
There is a less than 10% probability of the attacker capturing
the source within the safety period for these parameter
combinations. As more messages are grouped together, the
capture ratio falls lower. This matches with our previous
intuition that a greater number of messages grouped together
would give the attacker fewer chances to respond to messages
within the safety period. On the other hand, with messages
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Fig. 5: Results showing the messages sent per second.
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Fig. 6: Results showing the message latency.
being grouped together, it suggests that the message delivery
latency may be increased. When the size of the message group
is high, the protocol delivers near optimal privacy level.
As has been previously observed in [9, 10], we also see that
larger networks tend to have lower capture ratios.
C. Messages Sent per Second
As the different network sizes being varied each has a different
safety period, the number of messages sent has been normalised
with respect to the simulation length to allow the results to be
compared. The results show that the number of messages sent
does not vary greatly for different numbers of messages to
group together. For faster message rates, larger message group
sizes require slightly fewer messages sent per second.
D. Latency
The longer the time between messages, the larger the latency
between a source sending the message and the sink receiving
the message. This is because messages are delayed to make sure
that the number requested are about the sink-source distance
from the source. When there are multiple messages the per
hop delay needs to be longer. These results indicate that there
is a trade off between latency and capture ratio, to obtain a
better capture ratio using this technique a larger latency will
be required. For many applications a latency of this magnitude
will be acceptable. For example tracking the location of a slow
moving panda will not be adversely affected. But in scenarios
where very low latency is important, such as on a battlefield,
this technique may be less suitable.
VIII. DISCUSSION
The objective function chosen aimed to ensure that the attacker
ended up as far from the source nodes as possible. However,
this is stricter than the actual requirement of SLP which is that
the attacker must not capture (i.e., be co-located) with a source
within the safety period. Attempting to optimise this model
for other objective functions such as minimising latency or the
total number of messages sent might produce different output
indicating other kinds of routing that would provide SLP.
IX. CONCLUSION
In this paper we have presented a novel formalisation of
SLP-aware routing as an ILP constraint satisfaction problem.
This model produced optimal routes computed based on
global network knowledge, making these routes unamenable to
deployment. We then presented a distributed routing protocol
inspired by the optimal solution and performed large scale
simulations to judge the performance. Our results show that
we can obtain low capture ratios (high levels of SLP) with the
tradeoff being a higher delivery latency. For future work we
aim to expand the model to include fake message broadcasts
and to also look at optimising for other objective functions
such as the number of messages sent and the delivery latency.
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